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Abstract
Arms control treaties are necessary to reduce the large stockpiles of the nuclear weapons
that constitute one of the biggest dangers to the world. However, an impactful treaty hinges
on effective inspection exercises to verify the participants’ compliance to the treaty terms.
Such procedures would require verification of the authenticity of a warhead undergoing dis-
mantlement. Previously proposed solutions lacked the combination of isotopic sensitivity and
information security. Here we present the experimental feasibility proof of a technique that
uses neutron induced nuclear resonances and is sensitive to the combination of isotopics and
geometry. The information is physically encrypted to prevent the leakage of sensitive infor-
mation. Our approach can significantly increase the trustworthiness of future arms control
treaties while expanding their scope to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear war-
heads themselves.
Introduction
As of 2019 there are estimated 13000 nuclear weapons that make up the nuclear arsenals of the
United States and Russia1, 2. Such large arsenals may be one of the greatest threat to our civiliza-
tion. While high, these numbers are a significant reduction from the Cold War era, as a result
of series of arms control treaties. The past treaties between United States of America and Soviet
Union / Russia, however, primarily focused on the verified dismantlement of the delivery systems,
such as ballistic missiles and strategic bomber aircraft. This circumstance in part was driven by
the notion that the delivery systems can be a good proxy for the states’ strike capability during a
nuclear war. It was also driven by the difficulty of verifiably dismantling the warheads themselves
without leaking sensitive information about the weapon designs in the process3. This approach has
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left behind large stockpiles of surplus nuclear weapons, exposing them to the risk of theft and unau-
thorized or accidental use, as well as transfer to third countries. This state of the affairs elevates
the risk of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The need for more effective arms control
treaties is recognized by the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, which noted ”The United States
will continue its efforts to seek arms control agreements that enhance security, and are verifiable
and enforceable.”4 Furthermore, there are increased worries that unless new treaties are imple-
mented the current arsenal sizes will stagnate at the current numbers2, 5. New treaties involving the
verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads will significantly improve global security. However
new types of technologies are necessary to enable such treaties. These technologies will have to
detect hoaxing attempts, clear honest warheads as such, while simultaneously protecting sensitive
information about the weapon designs.
A variety of paradigms of verification have been proposed by a number of scholars and
scientists. The most recent of these, the template verification paradigm, is based on the expectation
that the inspection party will be able to acquire an authentic device (henceforth referred to as the
genuine reference object), and then use relevant encrypted data (known as a template) from this
device to compare with equivalent data acquired from candidate devices of the same design. The
key to this verification process is a proof system that can guarantee that no treaty accountable
item (TAI) undergoing verified dismantlement is secretly modified. A number of works have been
published on the philosophy behind this template verification - in the US national laboratories,
think tanks, and academia6–8 - and a variety of concepts have been proposed 8–16. Common to all
these studies is the concept of the genuine reference object, which is acquired based on a situational
context and brought to the testing facility via a chain of custody. For a more detailed delineation
of the procedure describing the acquisition of the genuine reference object (sometimes referred to
as golden copy in the literature) and its use in the verification exercises see Results section in our
previous work, Hecla and Danagoulian17. That work as well as the one presented in this study
leverage Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA). This technique uses neutron induced
nuclear resonances in the electron-Volt (eV) energy range, common in many high Z elements
including molybdenum, tungsten, uranium, and plutonium, to achieve high resolution imaging of
the individual isotopes of those elements18. The strength of NRTA stems from the uniqueness of the
resonance energies and amplitudes to individual isotopes, thus making their observation a unique
tag of a particular isotope’s abundance in the sample. NRTA has been previously used to image
and study various nuclear fuel samples and archaeological objects - for an in depth discussions see
Losko et al. and Bourke et al.19, 20.
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Some of the previously proposed concepts made use of physical cryptography. This has the
advantage of avoiding computational cryptography, which can be prone to hacks and backdoor
exploits and as such shifts the burden of verification to the computer code and electronic compo-
nents. Work by Philippe et al.11 had the advantage of achieving the highest level of information
security via a zero-knowledge measurement, yet it is not fully sensitive to isotopic hoaxes due to
the similarity of fast neutron processes between various nuclei. Additional work is currently under-
way to mitigate this circumstance, e.g. by observing fast neutrons from neutron-induced fission21.
Others, such as those by Vavrek et al.16 leverage nuclear resonance phenomena to achieve strong
isotopic sensitivity to hoaxes, but do not have zero-knowledge information security and involve
complex systems that may be unpractical in a verification setting. Our previous study, Hecla and
Danagoulian17, was based on Monte Carlo (MC) simulations, where we combined the advantages
of a neutron-based radiographic system with the isotopic-sensitivity of a nuclear resonance sensi-
tive measurement to achieve an effectively zero knowledge proof system.
Results
Template verification This work builds upon the general concepts described previously by Hecla
and Danagoulian17, with important differences and modifications. The study by Hecla and Danagou-
lian was based on Monte Carlo simulations alone and envisioned an imaging system where the
physical encryption is achieved by a geometrically complex reciprocal mask. The concept pro-
posed in this work meanwhile achieves an experimental feasibility proof of concept involving a
simple encrypting filter, and uses a single pixel neutron detector. The detector measures the com-
bined flux through the object and can determine the energy of individual neutrons. While a single
pixel measurement along one axis of measurement does not have geometric uniqueness, such a
uniqueness can be achieved via multiple measurements with object rotations, not dissimilar to the
principles of a tomographic system. This requires a new procedure for the comparisons between
template data from the genuine reference object and the equivalent data from the candidate items.
This study’s advantage is in the simplicity of the measurement as it avoids actual imaging and thus
enables higher degree of information security. It is also a direct experimental proof of feasibility
which is sensitive to the backgrounds, noise, and system instabilities not captured in a numerical
simulation.
The overall high level verification exercise is described in detail in Results section of Hecla
and Danagoulian17. In brief, in an unannounced visit to an ICBM base the joint team of the
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inspectors and the hosts acquires a randomly selected nuclear weapon, whose authenticity is thus
established by its situational context. The weapon is then transported under joint custody, i.e. in
the presence of both parties and via application of tamper-proof seals and checks22, to a facility
where it is disassembled in a controlled environment such that no new objects are introduced or
removed. The fissile hollow sphere, from here on referred to as the pit, is removed and used as a
genuine reference object. This study focuses on the stage involving the actual measurements test,
where the genuine reference object is being compared to the TAI candidate objects. The test needs
to detect both isotopic hoaxes as well as geometric hoaxes, described later in this section. The
experimental procedure consists of the following steps:
1. The genuine object, an encrypting filter, and the neutron detector are aligned along the beam
z-axis. The encrypting filter is produced by the host, and its composition is unknown to
the inspectors. The system schematic can be seen in Figure 1. The filter can be made of
any material, with the assumption but not the requirement that the hosts will add elements
identical to those in the TAI, with the only requirement being that the filter allow a significant
flux of neutrons to reach the detector for an agreed upon measurement time. A spectroscopic
measurement is taken, providing the template data (from here on referred to as template) that
the next measurements will be compared to.
2. Keeping the encrypting filter and the detector in their places the genuine object is replaced
with the candidate object at the same orientation. A measurement under experimental con-
ditions identical to step (1) is performed.
3. The data from the measurement of the candidate object is compared with the template in a
statistical test. If the test identifies a statistically significant difference then the candidate is
declared a hoax. If the new measurement passes the statistical test then the procedure moves
on to the next stage, where measurements under random rotations are performed.
4. Measurements described in the steps (1) and (2) are now repeated with both genuine and
candidate objects rotated at a random angle. To keep the number of unknowns larger than
the number of measurements a new encrypting filter is provided by the hosts. Like before,
the filter is kept in place during the two (genuine, candidate) rotated measurements. Similar
to step (3) the two measurements are compared in a statistical test. If the measurements
pass the statistical comparison then the candidate is declared isotopically and geometrically
identical to the genuine, and is thus accepted as genuine as well.
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Figure 1: General schematic of the experiment (not to scale). The combination of isotopic and
geometric sensitivity is achieved by neutron spectroscopy via time-of-flight (TOF) technique and
comparisons between the candidate and the genuine reference under random projections. For
simplicity, in this experiment the angles of the projections were chosen to be 0◦, 45◦, and 90◦.
This work focuses on a sensitivity study, experimentally demonstrating the feasibility of the
comparison. The technique is shown capable of clearing objects identical to the genuine reference
object and rejecting objects which are isotopically or geometrically different. The verification
exercise focuses on the weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) pit, primarily due to the weapon’s
hydrogenous components’ near-opacity to epithermal neutrons. HMX explosive, for example, has
a mean free path of ∼1.8 cm for epithermal neutrons. Public domain data on estimates of a Soviet
thermonuclear design23 indicate that the explosive’s thickness can be ∼6.5 cm, translating to an
attenuation factor of about 1000. While not impossible, a transmission measurement of weapons
at a lesser degree of disassembly would require either more intense neutron sources, or longer
measurement times. This may become possible in the future, as the laser driven and other high
intensity neutron sources currently under development become more applicable for field use24, 25. It
should be added that the plutonium pit may also contain other materials, such as coatings to prevent
the air’s corrosive effects on plutonium, as well as the beryllium neutron reflector shell which may
be bonded to the plutonium shell. The later has a mean free path of 1.3 cm for eV neutrons, and
depending on its thickness its attenuation effects may translate to measurement times somewhat
longer than those estimated in this work. This study thus focuses on an inspection scenario where
the plutonium pit has been extracted in a controlled environment and undergoes verification, as
described in prior work17.
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Figure 2: Cross sections. Total interaction cross sections for neutron induced interactions for a
subset of molybdenum and tungsten isotopes with significant resonances in the 1-200 eV range.
The experiment The overall diagram of the measurement setup can be seen in Figure 1, and
is discussed in more detail in Methods section. The neutrons are produced in a pulsed mode
from a pulsed electron linear accelerator, via a tantalum bremsstrahlung-photoneutron converter,
which produces neutrons via the (γ, n) reaction. A 2.54 cm polyethylene moderator degrades the
neutrons’ energy from the ∼MeV scale to the ∼eV scale. As the epithermal neutrons traverse the
object and the encrypting filter, their spectrum is modulated in accordance to the cross sections
and areal densities of the relevant isotopes, after which they are detected by a 6Li glass scintillator
detector. The detector produces a timing pulse, which is compared to the timing pulse of the
linear accelerator. This comparison allows to determine ttof = t − t0 of the neutrons. The energy
of individual neutrons can then be reconstructed via E = m(d/ttof)2/2, where m and d are the
neutron mass and the flight path length, respectively. The transmission spectra are normalized to
the incident neutron count, determined by a fission chamber (not shown) upstream of the target
object.
Targets As the research was performed in academic setting, plutonium and uranium targets were
not available. Thus, targets were built of more commonly available materials which have signif-
icant resonances in the relevant region of 1eV ≤ E ≤ 200eV and can thus act as proxies for
most uranium or plutonium isotopes. Natural molybdenum and tungsten were chosen as element-
6
Figure 3: Histograms of neutron count energies for two isotopic hoaxes. a The template data from
an authentic reference of 90/10 Mo/W composition (blue) is compared to the data from a 50/50
Mo/W isotopic hoax (red). b The data from the authentic reference is compared to that from a
10/90 Mo/W isotopic hoax (red). The legend lists the χ2 value, the number of degrees of freedom,
and the corresponding probability (p-value) for the χ2 test. Both hoaxes are rejected. The solid
and dashed vertical lines denote the locations of some of the known tungsten and molybdenum
resonances, respectively. Data collection lasted approximately five minutes per object.
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Figure 4: Histograms of neutron count energies for a geometric hoax. The geometric hoax has
been constructed as to have the same areal density along z-axis as the genuine reference. The
template data from an genuine reference (blue) is compared to the data from the geometric hoax
(red) at θ = 0◦ (a), θ = 45◦ (b), and θ = 90◦ (c). As expected per design the θ = 0◦ yields a
perfect agreement, as shown by the p-value. The rotations readily expose the hoax.
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Figure 5: Spectral comparisons between a genuine reference and an honest candidate. The mea-
surements were performed at rotation angles θ = 0◦ (a), θ = 45◦ (b), and θ = 90◦ (c). All
comparisons yield p-values of 50-95%, indicating an agreement, and thus clearing the candidates
as genuine objects.
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to-isotope proxies for 239Pu and 240Pu, respectively. Instead of hollow spheres, which are typical
to nuclear weapon pits, simpler cylindrical geometries were chosen, such that the genuine proxy
object is a cylinder of 50.8 mm diameter and 30 mm length, with the first 27 mm consisting
of molybdenum and 3 mm consisting of tungsten. Such a combination was chosen to mimic the
∼90% enrichment of WGPu. Plots of total neutron interaction cross sections for a subset of molyb-
denum and tungsten isotopes can be seen in Figure 2. Unlike molybdenum or tungsten the actinide
targets would produce additional neutrons via the (n,fission) reaction. However the resulting neu-
trons would be of the∼MeV energies, making the 6Li detector insensitive to them. The encrypting
filters were assembled from 3 mm and 6.35 mm thick tungsten and molybdenum plates, respec-
tively, that had 76.2 mm× 76.2 mm outer dimensions. The measurements at 0◦ rotation, described
in Figures 3, 4(a), and 5(a), used a filter consisting of three tungsten and three molybdenum plates
aligned with the beam. The measurements at 45◦ used a filter consisting of two tungsten and one
molybdenum plates, and at 90◦ the filter consisted of one tungsten and one molybdenum plates.
See Methods for additional detail on experimental settings.
Epithermal Neutrons In this experiment the neutron energies at the source spanned from the
∼MeV scale, known as fast neutrons, to ∼meV, referred to as thermal neutrons. However the
use of a thin cadmium filter near the source filtered out most neutrons below 0.5 eV. The detector
used to register the neutron hits was based on 6Li isotope, which interacts with neutrons via the
6Li(n, t)α reaction, with the triton and the alpha causing scintillation in the glass and thus trig-
gering detection. When combined with the TOF technique this allows to determine the neutron’s
kinetic energy witheV precision, allowing to resolve narrow absorption lines such as the 0.13 eV
wide line at 70.9 eV from 97Mo. The spectra in Figures 3, 4, and 5 were produced via this method.
The results of isotope-specific resonant absorption are most readily observable in Figure 5.
The solid vertical gray lines indicate the expected positions of the tungsten resonances, while the
dotted lines indicate the positions of the molybdenum resonances. Depending on an isotope, the
resonances are due to the (n,γ) and (n,n′) reactions, which selectively remove neutrons from the
beam at the resonant energies. The relative depth of the absorption lines primarily depend on the
resonance width, with broader widths translating to higher integrated cross sections and thus more
absorption. The shape of the absorption line in part depends on the type of the interaction. These
combined absorption features yield a unique spectral fingerprint of a particular configuration of
isotopic, geometric, and density distribution. Future research however should focus on providing
a systematic proof of this uniqueness, i.e. that no combination of other elements can reproduce
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uranium or plutonium signatures. See Supplementary Note 4 for a detailed discussion.
Isotopic Hoax resistance Isotopic hoax resistance refers to a system’s ability to detect hoaxing
attempts which involve modifications of the isotopic ratios in an otherwise geometrically identical
object. For a real warhead this may involve replacing the WGPu pit, which has enrichment levels
of more than 90%, with a pit made from the more available Reactor Grade Plutonium (RGPu),
which has a lowered 239Pu enrichment of approximately 60%, with the remaining ∼40% in the
form of 240Pu.
To test the sensitivity of the technique to isotopic variations the 90%:10% Mo:W genuine
reference object’s transmission spectrum was compared to the transmission spectra of 50%:50%
and 10%:90% Mo:W objects of the same cylindrical shape and overall dimensions. Figure 3 shows
the plots and comparisons of the spectra. The comparisons show that as the proportion of tungsten
is increased the tungsten absorption lines show increased absorption, while the molybdenum lines
exhibit reduced absorption, as expected. A simple χ2 test can be applied, determining the values of
χ2 and the corresponding probability p that the difference is merely due to random fluctuations. For
these comparisons the p-value is consistent with zero to ten significant digits, and thus indicates
that a systematic difference is present. The χ2 test thus rejects the comparison, and indicates a
hoaxing attempt. All measurements lasted approximately 5 minutes.
Geometric Hoax resistance A single measurement along the beam’s z-axis is only sensitive to
the projected isotopics along that axis. The transmission T for a an energy bin E and a spherically
symmetric geometry can be approximated as
lnT ' −
∑
i
σi(E)NAvρi
Ai
2pi
∫ cos θ′
1
∫ X
0
fi(r, cos θ)drd cos θ,
where σi(E), ρi,X , θ′ andAi are the cross section, density, total thickness, polar angle, and atomic
number for isotope layer i of the object, respectively. fi(r, cos θ) is the fractional abundance of iso-
tope i at a particular radial coordinate, and NAv is Avogadro’s number. The summation takes place
over all the isotopes, and the integration is along the radius and the polar angle. Thus, the sin-
gle pixel camera measurement effectively collapses the three dimensions into a zero-dimensional
energy-dependent-only measurement. This limitation can be readily overcome by making multiple
measurements at various angles, similar to tomographic measurements where a single pixel can
ultimately produce a three dimensional sensitivity. Unlike a tomography where the goal is to pro-
duce a three dimensional image, here the goal is to simply verify that two objects are identical to
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within some level of geometric complexity. Prior work has shown that two to three measurements
at randomly selected angles are sufficient to achieve this goal12. The random selection of the angles
at the time of the verification exercise renders the hosts unable to optimize a possible geometric
hoax to the measurement. The problem is thus reduced to proving that the system is sensitive to
geometric differences under rotations.
To show this sensitivity we perform measurements at 45◦ and 90◦ relative to the beam’s z-
axis. For this purpose the geometric hoax object was chosen to be a rectangular parallelepiped, i.e.
a box, of the same composition along the z-axis as the genuine reference object. It consists of a
50.8 x 50.8 x 27 mm3 box of molybdenum followed by a 50.8 x 50.8 x 3 mm3 plate of tungsten.
Since the beam diameter is only 44.5 mm, the spectral measurement results from two objects
should look identical at 0◦. However at 45◦ and 90◦ the geometric differences should amount to
different values of lnT .
To test the above hypothesis and the sensitivity of the system under rotations the measure-
ments were performed under identical beam conditions. Furthermore, for every rotation the en-
crypting mask was modified but kept the same between genuine-candidate comparisons. This is
a necessary step, as to prevent any differential analysis of data from multiple angles which may
otherwise reveal geometric information. In analogy to an under-defined system, every new mea-
surement needs an additional unknown, in the form of a different encrypting filter. Figure 4 shows
the spectral comparisons. It can be seen that at 0◦ the spectra are essentially identical, when com-
pared with a χ2 test. However, when rotated the small but significant differences in geometries give
rise to detectable deviations. While not as large as in the isotopic hoax, the differences are never-
theless statistically significant. This result shows that for these experimental settings, object types,
and measurement times the system can detect these geometric hoaxes with rotations by θ ≥ 45◦.
In this experiment all the rotations were centered on the geometric center of the object.
However, hollow spheres of the same thickness but different radii would produce identical signals
under such rotations, due to their spherical symmetry. This would result in an effective geometric
hoax. To break this symmetry the rotations should either involve a randomly chosen center, or be
followed by random translations. Overall this study focuses on a limited set of hoaxing scenarios,
and future studies need to focus on further extending these tests. As with most cryptographic
protocols, the concept presented in this work should undergo future tests and checks. The use of the
K-transforms in particular may prove promising in providing a proof of geometric uniqueness12.
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Completeness Finally, the test procedure needs to also show that it is able to accept honest candi-
dates. As with the geometric hoax sensitivity test, here the test needs to clear the honest candidates
at 0◦, 45◦ and 90◦ rotations, as a way of confirming that the objects are identical both isotopically
and geometrically. We thus repeat the procedure described in the previous subsection. This is
necessary in order to rule out the possibility that the previously observed differences were merely
the results of system instabilities, such as beam energy variations or detector gain shifts. Figure 5
shows comparisons where the genuine reference object measurements are compared to those from
identical, honest objects. Between these measurements the honest objects as well as the encrypting
filters were replaced with other targets and filters and then were placed back for the comparison
measurements. A marker on the target holder allowed for the precise setting of the rotational angle.
In one case the accelerator had to be turned off and restarted due to beam instabilities. As expected,
and despite technical disruptions, in all cases the χ2 test indicates that the differences are merely
statistical, as the p-value of the test indicates an agreement. It is then concluded that the system is
capable of clearing honest candidate objects. A summary of the test results are listed in Table 1.
Per procedure described at the beginning of the section, the test immediately rejects the attempts
at isotopic hoaxing. The geometric hoax shows an identical signal to the genuine reference object
at measurements along the z-axis, however rotations by 45◦ or larger immediately results in a re-
jection. Finally, the honest candidate measurements pass the test for all angles of rotation, and are
thus accepted as honest objects.
It is necessary to acknowledge that a small rate of false positives may be caused by difference
in ages between honest pits, caused by slight differences in 241Pu concentrations due its beta decay
into 241Am, as well as machining tolerances in pit production. As demonstrated in Supplementary
Note 3 the former is a minor effect that should not cause false positives for pits with age difference
of less than ten years. The later effect can be accurately estimated only given classified information
on pit production, and should be addressed in the classified setting. Our current modeling indicates
that differences of less than 1 mm should not trigger false positives.
Information Security One of the important goals of the verification system is the information
security, that is the inspectors’ inability to learn significant information about the TAI. In our prior
work we showed via computational simulations that while the inspectors can learn information
about the combined content of the TAI and the encrypting filter, they cannot learn anything spe-
cific to the TAI itself – see Hecla and Danagoulian17, subsection on Isotopic Information Security.
The primary focus of this study is the sensitivity analysis, with the purpose of showing that the
13
candidate object Mo/W
composition and shape
rotation χ2/NDF
p
value
decision
Isotopic Hoaxes
50/50, cylinder 0◦ 5491 / 1198 0.00 reject
10/90, cylinder 0◦ 10957 / 1175 0.00 reject
Geometric Hoax
0◦ 1196 / 1216 0.42 accept
90/10, cube 45◦ 1532 / 1225 0.00 reject
90◦ 1823 / 1245 0.00 reject
Honest Candidate
0◦ 1140 / 1218 0.94 accept
90/10, cylinder 45◦ 1124 / 1224 0.98 accept
90◦ 1234 / 1245 0.58 accept
Table 1: Statistical comparisons between the candidates and the genuine reference object. The
composition here refers to the relative lengths along z-axis of molybdenum/tungsten components
of the candidate objects. The total length of the objects is kept identical to that of the genuine
reference. The genuine reference is a cylinder of the length of 3cm, and Mo/W composition of
90/10. In order to pass inspection, the objects have to first pass the χ2 test along z axis (θ = 0), and
then along two rotations at 45◦ and 90◦. The procedure is shown to accept all honest candidates
and rejects both isotopic and geometric hoaxes.
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concept is capable of detecting hoaxing attempts. Nevertheless, we use experimental data from
the measurements in combination with a Geant426, 27 computational model of the experiment to
simulate scenarios with a WGPu pit and an encrypting filter of WGPu weighting 1.8 kg. In these
data-driven simulations we show that various opposite combinations of the TAI and filter geome-
tries produce statistically indistinguishable signals. This makes it impossible for the inspectors
to learn information of value, similar (but not identical) to the concept of zero-knowledge proof.
At the same time, additional simulations show that pairs of 5 minute long measurements at an
experimental facility similar to the one used in this study can readily detect cheating scenarios
where the WGPu pit has been replaced with RGPu, or where its size has been reduced by 2 mm
or less, depending on experimental conditions. See Supplementary Note 3 for a detailed discus-
sion. In Supplementary Note 1 it is demonstrated that using an encrypting filter of just 1.8 kg will
result in an inferred range of pit’s possible mass that spans from zero to a value that is signifi-
cantly larger than the critical mass. At the same time the combined target thickness will be small
enough to allow for significant counting statistics and thus reasonable measurement times. The
impact of temperature dependent broadening of the resonances is also estimated and described in
Supplementary Note 2, showing that the effect can be made negligible.
The presence of absorption lines associated with weapon materials whose presence may be
a priori unknown to the inspecting side is an important consideration in the context of information
security. If those materials were to have resonances in the energy domain of the measurement, the
inspector would learn about their presence. Given that this study focuses on a scenario where a bare
pit undergoes verification, the list of the elements that would be of significant quantities is limited
to the actinides and gallium, which is used to stabilize the plutonium in its δ-phase. Nevertheless,
to address possible concerns, the treaty signatories can agree that the host will put samples of all
elements that contain resonances in the agreed-upon range in their encrypting filters. In this manner
the inspectors will not be able to determine whether the absorption lines come from the weapon, or
the filter. The problem also has a technological solution. A neutron-opaque chopper synchronized
with the neutron pulse can be added to the beamline, with an opening chosen such that it only lets
through neutrons of a specific energy range. For example, for this experiment the [1,50] eV range
translates to TOF of [150,1061] µs. With an accelerator pulse rate of 25 Hz, a chopper rotating at
12.5 Hz would need two 41◦-wide openings centered at 27.25◦ and 207.25◦ phases relative to the
pulse to pass only the [1,50] eV neutrons. This opening angle and the rotation phase can be tuned
to match the desired energy range, including that of a single resonance. Any hoaxing attempts
involving shifting of phase or frequency would be readily exposed by the TOF data.
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Finally, the chain of custody for the selection of the genuine object and its tamper-proof
transportation to the dismantlement and verification facility is an important topic. Past literature
has discussed various approaches for achieving this goal6, 28, 29. Exercises by the US and European
national laboratories and organizations have taken place to test and characterize series of tech-
niques necessary for this goal. The Letterpress Exercise in particular has focused on the high level
procedure, as well as the various simple but robust tamper-proof methods. Such techniques include
electrical, mechanical, as well as reflective particle tag seals. Many of these low-tech methods use
a physical randomness to ensure that a broken seal cannot be faked or reproduced. For a detailed
discussion see Smartt and Marleau22 and Bunch et al.28. In addition to the particularities of the
chain of custody, the arms control treaties stipulating verified dismantlement will have to negotiate
the various conditions under which a particular verification technique is applied. For the method
described in this study in particular, the two sides should negotiate the following parameters: the
measurement time, beam current, and the resulting statistics, such that it is sufficient to detect the
likely hoaxes without raising any worries about excessive information; the minimum count rate
to be observed by the detector, derived from broad considerations of the weapon material quan-
tities, as a way of ensuring that the hosts do not add neutron-opaque materials to the encrypting
filter and thus make the measurements impossible; the manner in which the detector and source
instrumentation will be validated before and after the measurements, as away of ensuring that no
hoaxing and no information leakage has occurred. Generally, the use of physical cryptography
makes the acquired data fundamentally encrypted, thus significantly reducing information security
risks associated with the instrumentation that acquires the data. However validation of the instru-
mentation can further strengthen confidence. To this end, the inspection side could be asked to
provide n copies of the instrumentation package, with the option for the hosts to perform invasive
validation of the n − 2 copies, leaving the last two copies to be used interchangeably in the ver-
ification exercises. In this case the probability of the inspecting party to introduce two malicious
packages undetected is p = 1/
(
n
2
)
= 2/[n(n − 1)]. It should be clarified that we make no claims
that the concept proposed in this study is a zero-knowledge proof. Physical cryptography implies
a degree of information security less than zero knowledge, with a goal of protecting most useful
information, but not necessarily all information. The considerations listed in this section are only
part of a larger set of possible circumstances to consider. As is the case with most cryptographic
schemes, future research should focus on the pursuit of possible vulnerabilities and for solutions
for those.
16
Discussion
Past arms control treaties lacked a method for reliably verifying the dismantlement of the nuclear
weapons, and instead focused on the delivery systems, such as ICBM and strategic bomber air-
craft. This work experimentally demonstrates the feasibility of using resonance phenomena via
epithermal neutrons transmission to compare two objects and verify that they are isotopically and
geometrically identical, as part of a template verification exercise. Any differences in isotopics
and geometry between the candidate and the genuine reference object can be detected via isotope-
sensitive measurements by using multiple rotations. Similar to the requirements of zero-knowledge
proof, the inspectors cannot learn significant information about the object itself, and at most can
infer the combined mass and isotopics of the object and the encrypting filter. These combined
inferred quantities thus constitute upper bounds for the object, corresponding to the scenario of an
empty encrypting filter. It is shown that by selecting thicker encrypting filters of just 1-2 kg of
WGPu these upper bounds can be made large enough to make it impossible to infer any useful,
new information. Unlike most information barrier concepts the sensitive information is encrypted
in the physical domain, thus achieving a very high degree of information security. For an in-depth
discussion see the sections on information security in Hecla and Danagoulian17. Using the neutron
beam at an experimental facility similar to the one described in this study the measurements can
be performed in the combined time of less than an hour.
Additional and continued research in security studies arena and by the weapons laboratories
is needed to address the various high level political and technical aspects of a treaty that would
employ the techniques described in this study. In particular the joint chain of custody is paramount
to the validity of the genuine object which establishes the template. While no treaties stipulating
the verified dismantlement of the weapons have been enacted, exercises by US and European
national laboratories and institutes have explored the various real world considerations, testing a
variety of protocols and techniques to insure a secure chain of custody22. This study presents only
a basic concept, which will need to be embodied in particular designs adapted to the particular
treaty conditions and the characteristics of the available facilities and instrumentation.
Finally, research needs to be performed to study the feasibility of this technique in more com-
pact, possibly relocatable systems. The work presented in this study used a large facility due to its
convenience and the high precision neutron beam that it produced. However smaller, more com-
pact neutron sources may also enable such measurements. Such sources could be in the form of a
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pulsed deuterium-tritium (DT) generator, or small, commercial, linear accelerator driven sources
which use bremsstrahlung beams to produce neutrons via (γ,n) reactions. The later systems are
advantageous due to the large neutron flux that they would generate, and would be similar to the
facility used for this work, albeit at much smaller, laboratory-size scales. While this study focused
on the verification of plutonium components of a disassembled weapon, the advent of higher in-
tensity neutron sources, e.g. using laser-driven methods24, 25, may allow for the verification of fully
assembled weapons. The use of compact neutron source platforms may also allow for implemen-
tations of the technique described in this study using non-electronic detectors and preloads, similar
to the concept by Philipe et al11, with the possibility of extending this physically cryptographic
method to a fully zero-knowledge proof system.
Methods
Experimental Facility The experiment was performed at the 15 m station of the Gaerttner LINAC
Research Center at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The neutron beam was produced via a
60 MeV electron beam from the LINAC, which produced 1µs-long pulses with a repetition of 25
Hertz. An electronic signal from the pulse sets the start time t0 necessary for the TOF calculation.
The beam was incident upon a tantalum photoneutron target. Tantalum, due to its high atomic num-
ber, is a powerful source of bremsstrahlung photons when impinged by electrons. At 60 MeV most
of the energy loss by the electrons is radiative, i.e. via bremsstrahlung electromagnetic radiation.
At the same time the nucleus of 181Ta has a photoneutron production threshold of 7.6 MeV, via
the 181Ta(γ,n)180Ta reaction. The cross section for this reaction peaks to approximately 0.37 barns
at 14.7 MeV. Since the energy distribution of the bremsstrahlung photons is continuous, most of
the photons overlap with the energy domain at which the photodisintegration of 181Ta is at a max-
imum. The neutrons have an energy that is En = Eγ − 7.6 MeV, where Eγ is the energy of the
bremsstrahlung photon. Thus most of the neutrons are produced in theO(MeV) range. To produce
an epithermal beam a 2.54 cm polyethylene target was placed near the tantalum target, allowing a
small fraction of the fast neutrons to undergo elastic scattering on the hydrogen in polyethylene and
thus lose energy in a process referred to as moderation. The resulting neutron energy distribution
spans thirteen orders of magnitude from fast, MeV scale to the thermal, meV scale. For a detailed
description of the facility and the target design see Section I in Danon et al.30.
The resulting polyenergetic neutron beam was then transported via a beamline to the 15 m
station, named so because of the target to detector distance of approximately 15 m. A 6Li glass de-
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tector detected the neutrons, and registered their arrival times relative to the t0 of the electron pulse.
The neutron detector consisted of 3 mm-thick lithium glass scintillator with 6.6% lithium content,
enriched to 95% in 6Li. The scintillator is also sensitive to photons, however the photon arrival
times would be O(50ns), and thus could be rejected during the TOF analysis. Additional photons
are present during the neutron arrival times, primarily due to (n,γ) capture of the thermalized neu-
trons near the detector volume. Those events however can be suppressed due to the relatively weak
light output by photon interactions in the scintillator. The only remaining background in the TOF
analysis are the epithermal and thermal neutrons that scattered around the beamline. This effect
can be seen for example as the counts at the bottom of the 15-30 eV absorption lines in Figure 3.
This background however is constant, doesn’t change between multiple measurements, and thus
doesn’t affect the comparisons performed in this study. For a detailed description of the detector,
the data acquisition electronics, and the general experimental setup see Section II in Danon et al.31.
Energy reconstruction via TOF and statistical analysis Due to a thermalization times of . 1
µs and flight times of ∼ms, the pulse t0 amounted to an good initial measure of the epithermal
neutron emission time. The detection of the neutron in the scintillator produces a second pulse
with a time t, and the energy of the neutron can be then inferred from E = m(d/ttof)2/2, where
ttof = t− t0. During the analysis of the data however it became apparent that the slight dependency
of the moderation time on resulting neutron’s energy significantly distorted the energy reconstruc-
tion. This effect was particularly significant for the higher energy neutrons in the spectrum. To
quantify this effect simulations of this process were performed for the known geometries of the
moderator, using the Geant4 object oriented simulation toolkit32. The energy-dependent correc-
tions for thermalization time, which varied in the 4-8 µs range, were applied to the data, resulting
in a precise reconstruction of the known molybdenum and tungsten resonances up to 200 eV.
The energy dependence of the detected neutrons in the open beam varied significantly with
energy. This was caused in part by the intrinsic neutron flux, which changes significantly due to
the incident neutron spectrum, caused by the underlying moderation process in the polyethylene
moderator. It is also caused by the decreasing sensitivity of the 6Li glass detector with increased
energy, due to the power-law dependence of the 6Li(n,t)4He reaction, which has the form of σ ∝
E−1/2. The data acquisition of the facility bins the counts in 0.1 µs wide time bins in the 1-200
eV range. When converting to the energy via TOF, the TOF distribution, which can be described
as the time differential of the cumulative counting probability dP/dt, is weighted by the Jacobian,
dE/dt = −2E/ttof, such that dP/dE = dPdt /|dEdt |. All statistical errors are propagated accordingly
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to the final energy spectrum. Finally, to even-out the statistics throughout the broad 1-200 eV
range, the uniform binning is changed to a non-uniform binning, where increasingly larger bins
are assigned with increasing neutron energy.
The resulting spectral data from a pair of measurements were compared in a χ2 statistical test.
Assuming normally distributed errors, it is defined as χ2 =
∑N
1 (c0,i − c1,i)2/(c0,i + c1,i), where
c0 and c1 are the count arrays for the spectra undergoing comparison, and N is the total number
of bins. Given a value of χ2 and N , the probability, also known as p-value, can be determined
from the χ2 distribution. p-value describes the probability that two spectra’s differences are due to
statistical fluctuations alone. A low p-value, e.g. 1%, is indicative of statistical effects due to
cheating by the hosts.
Data availability All the data supporting the findings of this study are available from the corre-
sponding author upon reasonable request.
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Supplementary Note 1
Uncertainty range in the inferred pit mass. Here we consider the scenario where an inspector
uses the transmission data from a neutron beam to infer the range of possible pit masses. To
frame the problem, let’s assume a hollow pit of Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu) in a δ-phase of
density ρ ≈ 15g/cm3. We use public domain information about a Soviet thermonuclear warhead,
as reported by Fetter et al.1, which describe a hollow sphere of estimated inner radius of 6.27 cm
and an outer radius of 6.7 cm. Using a neutron beam of a radius of 2.5 cm (similar to the settings
used in the experiments in this study), the hosts use a WGPu cylindrical encrypting filter of 2.5 cm
radius and the length of 6 cm along the beam axis.
Both the pit and the encrypting filter have to be presented for measurements in boxes made
of materials that are optically opaque but transparent to neutrons, such as aluminum. The box size
could be about 20 cm. Both the pit and the reciprocal are aligned with external fiducial markers on
the box exterior, thus allowing for those same markers to be used in beam-target alignments – for
more detail see Hecla et al.2, Supplementary Note 3.
We now assume that the inspector has analyzed the data, has determined the attenuation A
and has used lnA = −µd, where µ is the linear attenuation coefficient, to infer the total thickness
d of the plutonium. The inspector has then inferred, correctly, that exactly 6.86 cm of WGPu are
present along the z-axis of the beam. What are then the possible values of the pit mass that the
inspector can infer from these numbers? There are two limiting scenarios that define the lower and
upper bounds on the estimates:
Scenario 0 At one extreme, the null scenario assumes that all the mass is found in the
encrypting filter. Thus for this limit the lower bound on the pit mass is Mnull = 0.
Scenario 1 Here the inspector assumes the opposite extreme - that all the WGPu mass is in
the pit and that the encrypting filter is empty. In this scenario the pit is a hollow sphere, with
an outer diameter matching that of the box, i.e. 20cm. In this case the mass of the pit is
inferred to be M1 = 15 · (4pi/3)[103 − (10− 6.83/2)3] grams, i.e. M1 ≈45 kg.
Thus the inspector can only infer that the range of the pit mass is in the range of [0,45] kg.
This constitutes useless information, as the critical mass of a bare plutonium sphere is ∼10 kg3.
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In other words the inspector has inferred numbers that range from the trivial (zero) to absurdly
trivial (super-critical). In the discussion above we made an assumption that the transmitted signal
is only dependent on the total areal density of plutonium traversed by the beam. In Supplementary
Note 3 we use experimental data and Monte Carlo simulations to prove this, showing that various
geometric and isotopic pit-filter combinations produce the same signal, as long as the average
enrichment and the total combined areal density is kept the same.
In this process the host used an encrypting filter of cylindrical shape of a mass of approxi-
mately 1.8 kg. An object of this mass is fully sub-critical, and should not be of any safety concern.
In a realistic verification campaign the host will need to produce filters of many thicknesses, fur-
thermore using different thicknesses for different rotations. However this does not mean that the
host needs to produce a number of monolithic filters equal to the number of all weapons under-
going dismantlement times the number of random rotations. The filter may consist of thin disks
of plutonium grouped together, allowing the host to modify the thickness by changing the number
of the disks. For example, the host can produce 59 disks of 1 mm thickness, 99 disks of 10 µm
thickness, and 10 foils of 1 µm thickness, allowing a range of thicknesses in the range of [0,6] cm,
with a discretization of just 1 µm. As the protocol cannot resolve thicknesses of 0.1 mm, this
discretization amounts to a continuum, allowing for continuously random filter thickness selec-
tions. This single set of disks can be reused between measurements, albeit with different number
of disks making up the filter, and will have a total weight of just 1.8 kg of WGPu.
It is necessary to point out that if a 6 cm filter is used, then the inspectors may be able to
infer that the pit is not a solid sphere. The diameter of a solid sphere of 3.4 kg, the mass of the
example used in this study, is closer to 7.6 cm. To avoid such outcome the host simply needs to
increase the thickness of the filter from 6 cm to 6.8 cm. This would require approximately 10%
longer measurement time to achieve the equivalent statistics.
As a final consideration it is also important to determine the expected attenuation of the
neutron flux by the combined WGPu thickness of 6.86 cm. Using JEFF-3.2 cross section data it is
possible to calculate the energy dependent transmission by this filter. Supplementary Figure 1 plots
this quantity, showing an average transmission of the order of ∼0.2. For comparison, the targets
used in the experiments described by this study involved transmissions significantly lower than this
number. It is then possible to conclude that a target of this combined thickness will still allow for
collection of the necessary statistics in reasonable times, e.g. ∼5 minutes. In Supplementary Note
2
3 we take this analysis further, using experimental data and Geant4 simulations for a WGPu pit
geometry to show that 5 minute long measurements are sufficient to detect a hoax.
Supplementary Note 2
Effects of decay heat on Doppler broadening of the resonances Most of the isotopes in the
plutonium pit of a warhead undergo alpha decay, which leads to constant generation of thermal
energy. This thermal energy results in a steady state heating of the pit. Different levels of heating in
the pit and the encrypting filter may give rise to a difference in resonant line widths due to different
extents of Doppler broadening. This could, theoretically, give rise to opportunities of inference
of pit material quantities via careful fitting of the absorption lines by the appropriate functional
forms. It is possible to determine the extent of this heating, the steady state temperature of the
pit, the extent of Doppler broadening, and thus describe the extent of this possible information
vulnerability.
The WGPu contains about 94% of 239Pu, as reported by Mark et al.3 in Table 1. The nucleus
undergoes alpha decay with the half life of 24110 years, emitting an alpha of 5.2 MeV. One can
then determine the total power of the heating, from
P = E · 0.00012 · fMNAv
A
ln(2)/τ1/2
where E is the energy of the alpha, f is the enrichment of a particular isotope, M is the mass of
the pit (3.4 kg for the example in Supplementary Note 1), τ is the half life of the isotope. For 239Pu
we find P239 = 6 Watt. Adding decay from 238Pu and 240Pu the total power is Pα ≈ 7 Watt.
Approximating the pit as a homogeneous sphere of a constant volumetric heat production,
we can now determine the steady state temperature at the surface of the pit, which is determined
by the following equation4:
T0 − T∞ = qR/3h
where T∞ is the room temperature, q is the volumetric heat production, R is the outer radius of the
pit, and h is heat transfer coefficient, which is approximately 20 W/m2/K for air flowing at 1 m/s,
a speed that can be maintained with a small fan installed in the opaque box containing the pit. We
then find that the surface of the pit will be only 6-7 K warmer than the surrounding air, translating
to just 2% difference in temperatures. With plutonium’s heat conductivity at ∼6 W/m/k, it can be
shown that the pit will be at approximately uniform temperature.
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Supplementary Figure 1: Dependence of transmission on the neutron energy. Calculated for (a)
6.86 cm of WGPu via analytical calculations based on JEFF-3.2 cross section data, and (b) for one
of the genuine object samples in this study via experimental data. By comparison to this study the
realistic WGPu measurement scenarios will involve larger statistics and thus will involve shorter
measurement times.
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Similarly, we can determine the average temperature of the WGPu encrypting filter as de-
scribed in Supplementary Note 1. For a cylinder of length z, radius R, and a total heat production
rate P the steady state temperature is
T0 − T∞ ≈ P
h(2piRz + 2piR2)
,
where h = 20 W/m2/K is the heat transfer coefficient of air flowing at 1 m/s4. Given the cylinder’s
size, it is possible to show that the Biot number is Bi 1, allowing for the above approximation.
Here we would like to point out that the encrypting filter does not have to be monolithic. To
address worries of criticality and to improve heat removal the 6 cm long cylinder can be split into
four identical 1.5 cm long, 450 gram cylinders, aligned with each other and with the beam. For one
of these cylinders the temperature difference with the ambient temperature is then T0−T∞ = 7 K,
which is less than 1 K higher than the temperature of the pit itself.
The Doppler broadening function for the resonance lines has a Gaussian form, with a stan-
dard deviation of ∆ = 2
√
EkBT
A
, see He´bert, page 355. The intrinsic resonances are typically
O(0.2eV ) wide, while ∆ ∼ 0.2eV. To understand its dependence on small variations in temper-
ature, we can write ∆ ∝ √T ≈ T0(1 + δT2T0 ), where we have Taylor expanded the square root
around T0 = 306.5 K, the average temperature between the pit and the encrypting filter. We then
conclude that the δT = ±0.5 K difference in temperatures of the pit and the filter will translate to
thermal broadening differences of ∼ ±0.08 %. It is then reasonable to assume that the difference
in the total line widths between the pit and the encrypting filter is too small to be detectable in a
measurement whose precision is fundamentally limited both by statistics and energy resolution.
However, if any doubts persist about differences larger than the one determined above, then
the host can resolve this by simply mounting heating tapes to either one of the two objects, and
perform temperature-controlled heating as a way of guaranteeing that the two objects are in fact at
exactly the same temperature.
Supplementary Note 3
The concept of Zero Knowledge proof requires that the verifier learns nothing new about the object
undergoing verification. In the context of an inspection exercise, it is important to show that the
inspectors will learn nothing of value as a results of their observations. In our prior work2, Section
Isotopic Information Security, we showed that the inspectors will be unable to make any isotopic
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Supplementary Figure 2: Spectrum of open beam neutron data from the experiment. The observed
absorption lines correspond to the resonances of the isotopes of a thin cadmium foil placed near
the photoneutron target for filtering out the thermal neutrons.
inferences about the Treaty Accountable Item (TAI). The experiments performed in this study
focused on a sensitivity analysis, with the goal to show that hoaxes can be detected, and thus did
not involve additional measurements testing the physical cryptography of the test. However open
beam data with no target or encrypting filters was collected. A Geant46 computational model of
the experimental facility uses this data as an input, allowing to simulate the transmitted neutron
signal for the weapon pit and encrypting filter geometries described in Supplementary Note 1. For
simplicity, only the 239Pu and 240Pu isotopes were used. The Geant4 used the JEFF-3.2 neutron
libraries7. Supplementary Figure 2 plots a spectrum of the open beam neutron data. The data shows
that 821504 neutron counts were registered in the 5 minute long measurement. Supplementary
Figure 3 shows a visualization of the Geant4 model. The 6Li glass detector used in this experiment
was placed 14.573 meters from the photoneutron target, with the targets placed 110 cm upstream
from the detector. The flight path was located in a 2 m wide concrete tunnel. The 6 cm encrypting
filter is split into four 1.5 cm section, for reasons described in Supplementary Note 2. Since the data
already encodes the detector’s intrinsic energy-dependent efficiency the detector in the simulation
is modeled at 100% efficiency. The experimental data is histogramed in Supplementary Figure 2.
The main arguments presented in Supplementary Note 1 are based on the assumption that
the transmitted neutron signal is only sensitive to the total combined thickness or areal density of
the pit and the encrypting filter. This implies that the total transmitted signal cannot be used to
infer specifics about the pit or the filter alone. To prove this, we have ran a series of simulations
6
Supplementary Figure 3: Rendering of the Geant4 model. It shows the beam line, the WGPu pit,
and the encrypting filter.
where we vary the pit and filter dimensions and isotopics such that the combined areal density and
the combined isotopic enrichment is kept constant. In all simulations 821504 neutron counts were
incident, sampled from the experimental data plotted in Supplementary Figure 2 and corresponding
to a 5 minute measurement at the experimental facility used in this study. Supplementary Figure 4
shows the spectral results of the simulations in the 0-200 eV and 0-60 eV ranges. Supplementary
Table 1 lists the various scenarios and the results of the output comparisons in a χ2 test. All of these
have the commonality of combined areal density as traversed by the beam. The χ2 tests show that
the results for the various combinations produce statistically identical spectral signals, indicating
that the signal cannot be used to infer information about the pit alone.
The principle of mass encryption also applies to the isotopics of the pit. While the inspectors
may be able to infer the combined, average isotopic enrichment of the pit and the encrypting filter,
that average translates to a very large range of possible pit-specific enrichment values. To prove
this, we performed simulations for a variety of enrichment levels for the pit and the filter. The
results show that given a freedom of variation on the filter enrichment, the pit enrichment may
vary in the range of 75-98%, yielding statistically identical result, as presented in Supplementary
Table 2 and Supplementary Figure 5. If the signal is independent of the pit enrichment then the
7
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Supplementary Figure 4: Results of the simulations of various pit masses. The spectra for three
scenarios are overlaid for 0-200 eV (a) and 0-60 eV (a) ranges, showing overall statistically iden-
tical distributions. The χ2 test results can be found in Supplementary Table 1.
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signal cannot be used to infer it. Hence as long as the inspector doesn’t know the enrichment of the
filter they cannot make inferences about the isotopic enrichment of the pit. At the same time the
technique shows that changing the pit enrichment from 93% to the 60%, typical for reactor grade
plutonium (RGPu), while keeping the encrypting filter the same, as would be the case in the actual
verification exercise, would result in a statistically significant difference. Such a large observed
difference would result in the rejection of the hoax. All simulation results reflect a 5 minute-
long measurement at the experimental facility where the data of this study was acquired. At the
same time, the simulations of hoaxing scenarios – one involving a shift in isotopics, and another
involving a shift in geometry – are readily detectable, as can be seen in Supplementary Figure 6
and tabulated in Supplementary Table 2. This result shows that a 5 min long measurement is easily
sensitive in isotopic changes of the WGPu/RGPu scale, and geometric changes of ∼2 mm. A
sensitivity to smaller changes can be achieved by increasing the measurement times, the neutron
beam flux (e.g. by increasing the beam current or by shortening the distance to the photoneutron
source), by choosing a more efficient photoneutron source, or by selecting a larger detector. We
can use the results from the above simulations to estimate the experimental conditions necessary
for achieving diversions involving mass removals as small as 0.1 mm. The χ2 is defined as χ2 =∑
(∆ci/σi)
2, where ∆ci is the count difference in a particular bin in Supplementary Figure 6
and σi is the uncertainty in that difference. Assuming that the difference changes linearly with
the difference in thicknesses (true for small changes relative to the total thickness, i.e. 2→0.1 mm
relative to 66.8 mm), a 20× decrease in the difference of thicknesses will translate to 20× decrease
in ∆ci, in average. This decrease in ∆ci needs to be compensated by a similar decrease in σi in
order to maintain the same statistical significance. This then translates to a statistical volume which
needs to be 400× larger. For the particular experimental facility used in this study, this would mean
the following changes: bring the measurement point from the 15 m flight path distance to 5 meters,
which will increase the neutron flux by 9×; increase the electron beam current by 2×; increase the
measurement times from 5 min to approximately 2 hrs.
A possible source of false positives may be introduced by the∼14.3 year half life β-decay of
241Pu into 241Am, causing differences between honest pits of different age. Since 241Pu constitutes
only ∼0.3% of WGPu 3,this is a small effect, in particular given that only 8.6 mm of the combined
thickness of 68.6 mm is the actual pit’s thickness. For this scenario, assuming a ”fresh” filter and a
pit of WGPu which is 10 years old, it can be shown that americium makes up only 1 part per 6650
of the areal density. To verify that the scale of this effect is insignificant we performed additional
simulations, where we compared a ”fresh” pit with no americium, to the one that has been ”aged”
9
for 10 years and has had some buildup of americium. Supplementary Figure 7 plots the two trans-
mission spectra. These spectra are slightly different from the results of other simulations. This
is only due to a more precise isotopic modeling, based on Table 1 of Mark et al.3. The spectral
comparison shows an overall agreement, and indicates that the differences of americium content
should not be a cause of false positives for pits with age differences of 10 years or less. Further-
more, the statistically identical spectra indicate that there is no americium-dependent information
content in the spectra themselves.
The analysis above is relatively simple, and while some sophisticated inference analyses are
theoretically possible, any concerns about information security - as well as the necessary fixes -
related to americium and other impurities should be the focus of future research, and are outside of
the scope of this study. For example, the use of a chopper, as described in the main body could be
used to physically limit the spectrum to very specific ranges which do not include the americium
lines. Also, the hosts can use filters with high content of americium, thus statistically diluting the
americium-specific differences between genuine pits. Finally, the hosts may simply choose to use
this technique to dismantle weapons of similar age as the golden copy. All these considerations
and trade studies are part of the future research, and should be done with the classified knowledge
of the weapons age, structure, and composition.
Supplementary Note 4
The method described in this study uses nuclear resonance phenomena as a basis for physical
cryptography. The main strength of resonance phenomena is that it involves signals that are unique
to individual isotopes, allowing to achieve a one to one map from the measurement space to isotope
space. However in order for this map to be truly one to one, the resonance energies for uranium
and plutonium need to be unique to their isotopes. While this study uses the broad energy range
of [0,200] eV as part of the proof of concept demonstration, the plutonium and uranium isotopes’
strongest and most clearly separated transitions are located in the narrower [0,10] eV range. This
is also the range where TOF techniques produce the highest resolution.
We thus focus on [0,10] eV range for a test of uniqueness. This means searching for possible
duplication of uranium and plutonium resonances in other, commonly available elements. Sup-
plementary Table 3 lists the major isotopes of the elements which have resonances in the above
mentioned range. The data was acquired from the National Nuclear Data Center(NNDC)8, and is
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Supplementary Figure 5: Results of the simulation for various isotopic enrichments. The spectra
for the three scenarios are overlaid for 0-200 eV (a) and 0-60 eV (b) ranges, showing overall
statistically identical distributions. The χ2 test results can be found in Supplementary Table 2.
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Supplementary Figure 6: Results of the simulation for two hoaxing scenarios – isotopic replace-
ment, and geometric change. A replacement of the WGPu pit with a RGPu while holding the filter
at WGPu enrichment readily reveals the hoax (a). Technique can also detect hoaxes involving cor-
rect isotopics but of a 2 mm smaller size (b). The χ2 test results can be found in Supplementary
Table 2.
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description radii, inner/ dfilter total pit 0-200 eV 0-60 eV
outer [cm] [cm] [cm] [kg] χ2 NDF p χ2 NDF p
no pit 0 / 0 6.86 6.86 0 - - - - - -
Black Sea
model
6.27/6.7 6 6.86 3.4 263 344 1.0 157 170 0.75
6kg pit 9.671/10 6.202 6.86 6 254 338 0.99 159 172 0.75
Supplementary Table 1: The various pit and encrypting filter geometries simulated. Sta-
tistical comparisons are performed relative to the scenario in the first row. The statistical
χ2 tests were performed for the 0-60 eV and 0-200eV energy ranges, with the probabilities
(p values) indicating a statistically identical signals.
Supplementary Figure 7: Comparisons of a fresh WGPu pit with no 241Am to a ten year old pit. In
this simulation the isotopic ratios were taken fro Table 1 of Mark et al.3. The overall comparison
yields a χ2/NDF = 161/170, with p = 0.68, indicating no false positive due to the differences in
americium content.
13
enrichment 0-200 eV 0-60 eV
description pit filter combined χ2 NDF p χ2 NDF p
WGPu 94% 94% 94% - - - - - -
super grade 98% 93.4% 94% 274 342 0.99 173 169 0.40
low grade 75% 96.7% 94% 253 330 1.0 158 165 0.64
RGPu hoax 60% 94% 89.7% 698 342 ∼ 10−26 573 169 ∼ 10−45
Size hoax 94% 94% 94% 399 340 0.015 291 171 ∼ 10−8
Supplementary Table 2: The various pit and encrypting filter enrichments simulated. Sta-
tistical comparisons are performed to the scenario in the first row. The results of the
simulation indicate that as long as the combined enrichment is constant, there is no sta-
tistically significant difference in the signal. At the same time a RGPu hoax is readily
exposed. The size hoax, which involves a pit of the correct enrichment but of an outer
radius 2 mm smaller than the reference object, is also detected.
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sorted by resonance energy.
An inspection of the table reveals that there are many isotopes that have resonances in this
range. Furthermore, some of these isotopes have resonances that are close in energy to some
plutonium or uranium resonances. However in order to achieve an isotopic hoax, it is not sufficient
to replicate an individual line. The elements or the combination of elements in a potential hoaxing
mix need to have a combination of lines that simultaneously reproduce plutonium’s resonances’
energies, widths, and relative strengths. At the same time this combination of elements should not
give rise to any additional lines. For example, to emulate 241Pu and 239Pu lines at 1.73, 4.3, 4.6,
5.8, 6.9, 7.8, 8.6, and 10.1 eV the host could try to use the 1.46, 4.3, 4.4, 5.91, 7.2, 7.8, 9.06,
and 9.9 eV lines of indium, tantalum, rhenium, cesium, and hafnium, respectively. However, this
mix of elements will also produce lines at 1.3, 3.8, 5.36, and 6.1 eV - lines that are missing in
plutonium isotopes. Furthermore, at higher energies these elements manifest additional lines not
seen in plutonium or uranium. These non-fissile lines in the hoax will induce significant differences
in measurements between the hoax described above and a plutonium pit, resulting in a rejection of
the hoax.
While this analysis indicates the difficulty of achieving isotopic hoaxing by combination of
other elements, future research needs to focus on the problem of uniqueness, i.e. systematically
proving that no combination of materials can simultaneously reproduce the combined cross sec-
tion shape of plutonium’s isotopes. Since future embodiment of this technique may involve more
compact experimental setups with an energy resolution that is lower than the one observed in this
study, the analysis of uniqueness also needs to take into account energy resolution for a particular
experimental setting.
Note that Supplementary Table 3 only includes elements that are easily available and are not
difficult to handle. The table does not list the resonances of 241Am, for example, as americium is
too radioactive to be used in any hoaxing manipulation that requires ∼kg quantities of materials.
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